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Abstract: A long-standing controversy is whether LBOs generate economic efficiencies through 
a superior governance framework, or whether LBO funds are driven by short-term profit motives 
and sacrifice long-term growth to boost short-term performance. Using a propensity score 
methodology, this paper provides an empirical analysis of the innovative efforts of a sample of 89 
French manufacturing firms that underwent a buyout between 2001 and 2005. The matching 
estimates (average treatment on the treated, ATT) of the effect of LBOs on firm level of 
innovation expenditures in 2006 show no significant differences between LBO targets and 
comparable companies that did not go through an LBO. In contrast, we find significant effects of 
LBOs on both service innovation and marketing innovations in design and packaging and product 
promotion. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation is an essential preoccupation for a firm as it affects its competitiveness. A long-
standing controversy is whether LBOs generate economic efficiencies through a superior 
governance framework, or whether LBO funds are driven by short-term profit motives and 
sacrifice long-term growth to boost short-term performance.  
LBOs involve investments in which investors and a management team pool their own money 
(together with debt finance) to buy shares in a target company from its current owners 
(Meuleman et al., 2009). Although the change in governance resulting from LBOs is generally 
found to exert a positive impact on firm‟s economic and financial performance (Cumming et al., 
2007), these transactions have mainly been associated with cost-cutting activities and short-
termism, to the detriment of innovation and Research and Development (R&D) investments. 
However, in a recent study, Boucly et al. (2011) show that, instead of reinforcing credit 
constraints, as was the case in the 1980s transactions, today‟s LBOs can alleviate them. 
Whether LBOs have an impact on innovation is not clear, a priori. Both positive and negative 
effects are likely to occur. After an LBO, technological matters may be delayed or set aside 
because managers may be more oriented to day to day operations resulting from the transaction 
(Hitt et al., 1996) or because private equity firms exert pressure on management to focus on 
investment opportunities that are less uncertain and more rewarding in the short term (Ughetto, 
2010).  
Alternatively, LBOs may foster entrepreneurial initiatives, enabling managers to better and more 
thoroughly exploit firm resources for new innovation projects (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 
2001). There are two reasons for this. First, private equity-backed buyouts can make use of the 
private equity firm's extensive network and relationships: customers, suppliers, other investors, 
access to more sophisticated resources in banking, legal and other areas, etc. Second, the private 
equity firm's expertise and competencies with regard to strategy, operational and financial 
management, human resources, marketing policy, and mergers and acquisitions, also help create 
value for the target firm (Lee et al., 2001; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, and Dial, 2001). Inside 
management does not always own the tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic skills required to seize 
new opportunities (Hendry, 2002). If major innovation is required, it may be necessary to 
introduce outside managers who do own these skills (Wright, Hoskisson, and Busenitz, 2001). In 
this situation, the private equity firm plays an important role in assessing the skills of the 
incumbent managers and their potential replacements (Meuleman et al., 2009). 
Evidence regarding the impact of LBOs on investment in innovation and R&D is so far limited 
and rather mixed. Some studies show a decline in R&D spending (Long and Ravenscraft, 1993) 
whereas others find no decline (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990) or stability (Smith, 1990) of 
research spending after the LBO. However, as most firms involved in LBOs do not belong to 
technology-intensive industries, the impact of LBOs on cumulative innovation is likely slight 
(Hall, 1990). 
In industries where R&D requirements are more crucial, these expenditures are used more 
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effectively. Zahra (1995) finds, on a sample of 47 LBOs, that firms involved develop more new 
products and intensify their efforts in terms of innovation and productivity (even if at the same 
time the level of R&D expenditure doesn‟t change). Wright et al. (2001) provide several 
examples of buyouts in technology-based industries followed by significant increases in product 
and technology development, R&D and patenting. Malone (1989) and Wright, Thompson and 
Robbie (1992) also cite evidence of new product innovation following buyouts. 
More recently, Lerner et al. (2011) investigate 472 LBOs with a focus on investments in 
innovation as measured by patenting activity. They find no evidence that LBOs are associated 
with a decrease in these activities. Contrary to the frequent argument that private equity firms 
have short-term horizon and little incentive to favor long-term investment opportunities of target 
companies, this study shows that LBOs lead in fact to significant increases in long-term 
innovation. The authors find that patents granted to firms involved in LBOs are more cited (a 
proxy for economic importance) and show no significant shifts in the fundamental nature of the 
research. Hence, if some US and UK based studies show a decline in investment expenditure 
after LBOs, critical investments in R&D seem to be maintained. Ughetto (2010) has focused on 
innovation of Western European manufacturing firms undergoing an LBO. She finds that 
innovation activity of portfolio firms (measured by the number of patents granted) is affected by 
different types of investors, pursuing different objectives.  
There are a several reasons to revisit the questions in the previous studies. First, the private equity 
industry is more substantial today than it was in the 1980s. Changes in the industry–such as the 
increased competition between and greater operational orientation of private equity firms–suggest 
that the earlier relationships may no longer hold. Second, transactions involving technology-
intensive industries have become more common recently and it is also desirable to look beyond 
public-to-private transactions, since these transactions represent a fairly small fraction of the 
private equity universe. Third, the innovation surveys conducted in the last two decades have 
substantially enhanced our ability to measure and study the impact on innovation. Fourth, nearly 
all studies on LBOs and innovation have concentrated on the US and the UK (the only exception 
we are aware of is the study of Western Europe by Ughetto (2010)). By shifting the focus to 
France and following Boucly et al. (2011), this paper investigates the possibility that some LBOs 
aim to seize innovation opportunities and expand the scale and scope of the target‟s activities. 
France is an interesting context to study LBOs and innovation because it is a country with many 
family-managed firms that tend to be, on average, smaller than non family firms and for which 
access to external finance may be more difficult than in the US or the UK.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the construction of the 
sample. Section 3 reviews the methodology employed in the study. We present the empirical 
analyses in Section 4. The final section concludes the paper and discusses future work. 
2. Dataset 
To analyze the impact of LBOs on innovation at the company level, we use a new database built 
from three different databases: Capital IQ (to isolate transactions), CIS 2006 (for innovation data) 
and DIANE (for financial statements). To our knowledge, this is the first study to use a CIS 
survey (Community Innovation Survey) in relation with LBOs. Community Innovation Surveys 
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are conducted at regular intervals in Europe. Questions are based on the Oslo Manual guidelines, 
which distinguishes four types of innovations: product innovations, process innovations, 
organizational innovations and marketing innovations. The Oslo Manual opted for collecting data 
at the firm level, including all its innovation outputs and activities, which is also the level of 
available accounting and financial data that can be merged with the innovation data for richer 
analyses. CIS 2006 was launched in 2007, based on the reference period 2006, with the 
observation period 2004 to 2006. The population of the CIS is determined by the size of the 
enterprise and its principal activity. All enterprises with 20 or more employees in any of the 
specified sectors were included in the statistical population. The following industries were 
included in the population of the CIS 2006: mining and quarrying (NACE 10-14), manufacturing 
(NACE 15-37), electricity, gas and water supply (NACE 40-41). Three reference periods were 
used in the questionnaire: 
 The first relates to a set of questions for the whole of the period 2004-2006, for example 
whether the enterprise introduced an innovation at any time during this three-year period.  
 The second set of questions refers uniquely to the reference year 2006, for example, 
indicators such as innovation expenditure.  
 Finally, a limited number of basic economic indicators were requested for both 2004 and 
2006, for example the turnover and employment figures.  
We first identify 944 French deals over 2001-2005 reported as being “LBOs” from Capital IQ. 
More precisely, we retrieve all the deals from Capital IQ with the following characteristics: (i) 
they are announced between 2001 and 2005 (ii) either “closed” or “effective” (iii) reported by 
Capital IQ as being “LBOs”. Most of the targets are medium sized, privately held firms. We then 
obtain innovation data from CIS 2006. Our transaction and innovation data do not have the same 
identifier so we match them by company name. Names are not always identical in both databases, 
so in case of ambiguity we resort to company websites and annual reports. The matching process 
reduces sample size to 109 transactions, of which 89 have available financial statements in Diane 
(Bureau Van Dijk) for the year preceding the transaction.  
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the final sample. 47% of deals take place since 2004. 
Slightly less than 40% of the sample is composed of companies in intermediate goods (52% in 
terms of value of the deals). In terms of size, the sample is mostly constituted of relatively small 
companies: 34% of targets have less than 20 million (M) Euros in sales at the time of the deal, 
and 67% have less than 75M. Companies with sales above 75M constitute 31% of number but 
73% of the value of deals. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of final sample 
This table shows the number and value of deals in the sample. Value is measured using the sum of sales revenue of companies in 
each category, in thousands of Euros, for the year prior to the deal. Breakdown by sector follows the French classification named 
NES16 (Nomenclature Economique de Synthèse). 
Panel A : Breakdown by year     
 Number % Value % 
2001 18 20.22% 1 099 628 19.07% 
2002 12 13.48% 1 000 782 17.35% 
2003 17 19.10% 1 139 305 19.76% 
2004 22 24.72% 1 162 113 20.15% 
2005 20 22.47% 1 364 967 23.67% 
     
Total 89  5 766 795  
 
Panel B : Breakdown by Sector     
 Number % Value % 
Agricultural and food industries 7 7.87% 511 133 8.86% 
Consumer Goods Industry 13 14.61% 596 591 10.35% 
Automotive Industry 6 6.74% 241 696 4.19% 
Capital goods industries 24 26.97% 1 232 990 21.38% 
Intermediate goods 35 39.33% 3 019 754 52.36% 
Energy 4 4.49% 164 630 2.85% 
     
Total 89  5 766 795  
 
Panel C : Sample Breakdown by Sales revenues     
(Sales in Thousand of Euros) Number % Value % 
(0;20000] 31 34.83% 303046 5.26% 
(20000;75000] 30 33.71% 1201816 20.84% 
(75000;150000] 18 20.22% 1762976 30.57% 
(150000; max] 10 11.24% 2498958 43.33% 
     
Total 89  5 766 795  
3. Methodology 
Gauging effects of LBOs on innovation is not trivial because LBOs do not occur randomly across 
the population of firms. LBO targets are selected by investors presumably because of their value 
creation potential. If an outside observer concludes that the average level of innovation 
expenditure of firms targeted by an LBO is higher than in other firms, one cannot rule out the 
possibility that this finding is due to the fact that LBO investors tend to select better firms on 
average relative to the population. 
We address the problem of sample selection bias using a propensity score methodology (PSM) 
(Rubin, 1974; Heckman et al., 1999). We benchmark the level of innovation of LBO firms by 
selecting appropriate matching control firms to each LBO. The set of matching control firms is 
composed of firms that share the same financial characteristics as the LBO firm prior to the 
transaction. To select matching firms that have ex-ante the same probability of being selected by 
LBO investors, we implement a probit model to estimate the likelihood of being an LBO target in 
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a given year and we use the use the probability estimate from that model to find a matching 
control for a firm that indeed was the target of an LBO deal
1
.  
The main steps of the PSM procedure are as follows. First, we introduce filters to obtain a dataset 
composed of about 1,200 companies. We need to do this because fitting a discrete choice 
regression model where the number of „zeros‟ (that is, observations where the firm is not an LBO 
target in a given year) is very high relative to the number of „ones‟ (that is, observations where 
the firm is an LBO target in a given year) results in poor estimates. This is the case since CIS 
2006 contains data for about 5,200 companies, and the sample contains 89 LBOs (2 % of the 
dataset). We therefore introduce filters to obtain a manageable number of non-LBO observations. 
A matching company belongs to the same 4-digit sector as the target. If there are more than ten 
twins, we just keep the ten nearest neighbors to the target with the nearest turnover the year 
preceding the buyout. The matching methodology allows us to retain 1,144 “twin” companies to 
the sample, i.e. 12.85 twins by target. We choose 1,200 as a number that seems reasonable 
because it means that LBOs constitute about 8% of the regression sample.  
Second, we run a probit regression that models the likelihood of a firm being the target of an 
LBO in a particular year. Denote by hk* the latent unobservable variable that represents the net 
present value of the acquisition of firm k by a bidder and hk,t a dummy that takes the value of 1 if 
an LBO bid is made in year t: hk,t = 1 if hk,t* >0 or hk,t = 0 if hk,t* < 0. The probit regression to be 
estimated for the probability of Pr(hk,t = 1) is: 
hk,t* = α +Wk,t δ + υk,t   (1) 
The matrix Wk,t contains firm-specific variables that the literature has identified as determinants 
of the likelihood that a firm is an LBO target, namely firm size (measured by turnover), the debt-
equity ratio, the level of income taxes, the firm‟s profitability (measured by ROIC), liquidity 
(proxied by cash divided by assets) and level of working capital (Le Nadant and Perdreau, 2006). 
The predicted value from regression model (1) is called the propensity score. Its interpretation is 
that it measures the probability, as predicted by the model, that a firm becomes an LBO target in 
a given year. In other words, firms with similar propensity scores share similar characteristics 
that lead to being an LBO target. They constitute therefore adequate benchmarks for LBO 
innovation capacity. 
Third, we use propensity score to match comparison units with treated units. Smith and Todd 
(2005) note that measuring the proximity of cases as the absolute difference in the propensity 
score is not an approach that is robust to “choice-based sampling,” where the treated are 
oversampled relative to their frequency in the population of eligible individuals (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). As a consequence, we match on the log odds of the propensity score, defined as 
p/(1-p), to assure that results are invariant to choice-based sampling. 
Different matching algorithms can be used: kernel matching, nearest-neighbor or radius 
matching. As we have many firms not involved in LBOs in our dataset, the radius matching 
                                                          
1
 For a binary treatment variable, there is no strong advantage to using the logit vs. probit model. We also ran a logit 
model and found similar results. 
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algorithm (with a caliper of 0.06) is more appropriate: it enables us to compare firms with very 
close predictions of probit models. To avoid the risk of poor matches, radius matching specifies a 
“caliper” or maximum propensity score distance by which a match can be made. The basic idea 
of radius matching is that it uses not only the nearest neighbor within each caliper, but all of the 
comparison group members within the caliper. In other words, it uses as many comparison cases 
as are available within the caliper, but not those that are poor matches (based on the specified 
distance). The robustness of our results is tested using other matching methods. We then measure, 
for each LBO, its level of innovation relative to the level of innovation of its matching control 
pair. 
4. Post LBO innovation: evidence and robustness 
a) Main results 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for accounting measures of LBOs and the non-LBOs firms. 
Relative to their potential controls, LBO firms are larger (65 M in average turnover vs. 40M) and 
slightly more profitable (23% vs. 20% in terms of average ROIC), and they have higher income 
taxes expenses the year before the deal (2.39% of sales for LBO vs. 1.63% for non-LBO). Only 
differences in size and income taxes expenses are significant (see Appendix 2). 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for sample deals for the year before the deal. «LBO companies» refers to 
statistics of the sample of LBO firms. «Non-LBO companies» refers to statistics of the sample of all non-LBO 
companies from which matched controls are chosen using a propensity score model. All these accounting variables 
are obtained from DIANE. Turnover is in thousands of Euros. Income taxes expense and working capital are divided 
by turnover. Working Capital is divided by net fixed assets. Debt-to-equity is measured by financial debt divided by 
shareholders‟ equity (in %). 
 
 Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Non-LBO 
companies 
Turnover 1144 39566.79 67002.48 10.76 568409.10 
ROIC 1144 0.1966 0.6307 -5.0873 13.6855 
Income taxes 1144 0.0163 .02335 -0.1314 0.1385 
Working capital 1144 0.1936 0.4171 -2.0513 6.4868 
liquidity 1144 0.7149 5.0250 0 123.8937 
Debt-to-equity 1144 80.92 626.39 -2225.51 13804.17 
      
 Turnover 89 64795.45 83478.02 20.13 483000 
LBO 
companies 
ROIC 89 0.2259 0.2817 -1.0051 1.0727 
Income taxes 89 0.0239 0.0407 -0.1610 0.2417 
Working capital 89 0.2173 0.6906 -0.1633 6.4498 
liquidity 89 0.3629 0.9031 0 7.5630 
Debt-to-equity 89 56.63 216.68 -580.73 1721.00 
 
The results of the probit model show that the largest firms and those that have the highest level of 
income taxes have a higher probability of being an LBO target (Table 3). In contrast, firms‟ 
financial structure, profitability, liquidity and level of working capital do not seem to explain 
LBO likelihood. 
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Table 3 – Estimations of the Probit model 
Turnover is in thousands of Euros. Income taxes and working capital variables are divided by turnover. Liquidity 
variable is measured by cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. Debt-to-equity is financial debt divided by 
shareholders‟ equity. 
 Probit regression on 2001-2004 
 
Probit regression on 2001-2005 
 
Indep.variables Coef Std. Error Coef Std. Error 
Turnover 0.1278*** 0.0427 0.1521*** 0.0389 
ROIC 0.0629 0.1063 0.0234 0.1040 
Debt-to-equity -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 
Income taxes 6.2601*** 2.3278 4.3494** 1.9705 
Liquidity -0.0103 0.0296 -0.0267 0.0554 
Working capital 0.0698 0.1245 0.0744 0.1171 
Constant -3.7741*** 0.7318 -4.1082*** 0.6705 
 
Number of Obs. = 1004 (69 LBOs) 
LR Chi2(6) = 18.31 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.005 
Pseudo R2 = 0.036 
Number of Obs. = 1233 (89 LBOs) 
LR Chi2(6) = 23.01 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.001 
Pseudo R2 = 0.036 
Notes: Significance levels: ***(1%) and **(5%). 
 
Table 4 reports both unmatched and matching estimates (average treatment on the treated, ATT) 
of the effect of LBOs on firm level of innovation, measured as innovation expenditure in 2006 
divided by turnover in 2006.  
The matching estimates (average treatment on the treated, ATT) of the effect of LBOs on firm 
level of innovation in 2006 show no significant differences between LBO targets and comparable 
companies that did not go through an LBO. Moreover, we find no significant effect of LBOs on 
innovation expenditure at different periods of time (one-year after transaction for LBOs in 2005, 
two-year after transaction for LBOs in 2004, etc.). Evidence thus suggests that private equity 
intervention is not detrimental to long-term investments in innovation. 
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Table 4 – Effect of LBOs on the level of innovation expenditure in 2006 
Innovation expenditure is measured by all innovation expenditure in 2006 declared by firms as a percentage of 
turnover the same year. 
Variable: 
innovation 
expenditure 
Treated Controls Difference S.E. 
Unmatched 2.8454 2.7256 .1197 .8062 
ATT 2.8454 2.7240 .1214 .9560 
Number of 
observations 
89 1144   
Notes: Significance levels: ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%). 
 
Even if LBO targets have the same level of innovation expenditure as their matched counterparts, 
LBOs might have an effect on other innovation outcomes. Indeed, LBOs might foster 
entrepreneurial initiatives and innovation projects that are not costly and do not require important 
expenditure. Table 5 presents PSM estimations on innovation outcomes for LBOs that occurred 
from 2001 to 2004 (69 LBOs) whereas Appendix 1 presents the innovation outcomes and 
innovation variables definitions. As questions in CIS 2006 relate to the 2004-2006 period, we 
exclude 20 LBOs that occurred in 2005 from the sample to run these estimates. The comparison 
of unmatched and ATT estimates (not reported here) shows the efficiency of the matching 
method, which significantly reduces the selection bias. Indeed, differences between LBOs and 
non-LBOs on several outcome variables appear to be significant when they are estimated with 
unmatched units. For instance, for product innovation (inpdgd) and innovation in external 
relations (oorgexr), t-statistic values are respectively 1.68 and 1.78 (significant at 10% level) but, 
after matching, the differences are no longer statistically significant, suggesting that matching 
helps reduce the bias associated with observable characteristics. 
Table in Appendix 2 shows the results of the balancing test for the radius model. It confirms the 
validity of the matching method, which significantly reduces the bias for all covariates. The 
balancing test measures the “similarity” of observations remaining after the matching process.  
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Table 5 – ATT estimates of innovation outcomes during 2004-2006 
Variable type 
 
Variable code Treated Controls Difference S.E. 
Product 
innovations 
inpdgd .5147 .4385 .0761 .0632 
inpdsv .2500 .1594 .0905* .0542 
newmkt .4264 .3249 .1014 .0623 
newfrm .4411 .3237 .1174* .0626 
turnmar .0613 .0645 -.0031 .0197 
turnin .0544 .0483 .0060 .0172 
turnung .8842 .8871 -.0028 .0277 
Process 
innovations 
inpspd .3676 .3704 -.0027 .0610 
inpslg .1911 .1619 .02918 .0495 
inpssu .1764 .1718 .0045 .0482 
Organisational 
innovations 
oorgbup .3823 .3905 -.0081 .0615 
oorgkms .2205 .2517 -.0312 .0527 
oorgwkp .3088 .3183 -.0095 .0585 
oorgexr .2500 .1762 .0737 .0544 
Marketing 
innovations 
mktdgp .3235 .1869 .1365** .0585 
mktpdp .2647 .1686 .0960* .0553 
mktpdl .1029 .0988 .0040 .0383 
mktpri .1617 .1044 .0573 .0461 
Patents and other 
protection 
methods 
ProPat .2941 .3245 -.0304 .0577 
ProDsg .2352 .1954 .0398 .0534 
ProTm .3823 .2847 .0976 .0611 
ProCp .1029 .0676 .0353 .0380 
prosol .1029 .0666 .0363 .0380 
ProSct .1764 .1479 .0285 .0479 
ProCon .2647 .2407 .0239 .0557 
ProTech .2352 .1776 .0576 .0533 
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Factors 
hampering 
innovation 
activities 
HFent 1.4117 1.2967 .1150 .1331 
Hfout 1.0147 .8110 .2036* .1240 
Hcos 1.4411 1.2949 .1462 .1431 
Hper 1.3970 1.1712 .2258* .1219 
Htec 1.0 .8451 .1548 .1044 
Hinf 1.0 .8801 .1198 .1112 
Hpar .8529 .8068 .0460 .1101 
Hdom 1.1029 1.0524 .0504 .1359 
Hdem 1.2647 1.1083 .1563 .1299 
Hprior .5882 .6676 -.0794 .1136 
Hmar .8088 .8727 -.0639 .1325 
Number of 
observations 1,004 69 935   
Notes: Significance levels: ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%). 
 
Regarding product and process innovations, we find that LBO targets are more likely to 
implement service innovations. Hence, results suggest that LBOs lead to significant 
improvements in how services are provided (for example, in terms of their efficiency or speed), 
the addition of new functions or characteristics to existing services, or the introduction of entirely 
new services. However, as we also find an effect on innovations that are new to the firm but no 
effect on innovations that are new to the market, we can conclude that LBOs lead to minor 
product innovations that have already been implemented by other firms. Hence, it is likely that 
the nature of the innovation in LBOs is based upon incrementally improving current products for 
existing markets rather than developing new products and processes (Zahra and Fescina, 1991). 
Regarding organisational and marketing innovations, we find significant effects for two variables 
of marketing innovation only: innovations in design and packaging and in products promotion. 
Marketing innovations are aimed at better addressing customer needs, opening up new markets, 
or newly positioning a firm‟s product on the market, with the objective of increasing the firm‟s 
turnover. LBOs have a significant effect on changes in product design and packaging that are 
intended to change or enhance the product‟s appeal or to target a new market or market segment. 
They also have a positive impact on promotional efforts made by firms to improve their products‟ 
image or to increase awareness of their products. This evidence confirms that private equity firms 
provide superior managerial and technical expertise that enables target firms to seize innovative 
opportunities. 
In contrast, we find no effect of LBOs on the methods of protecting innovations. In particular, we 
show that LBOs have no impact on patenting activity. This result is in line with Lerner et al. 
(2011).  
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Last, innovation activity may be hampered by a number of factors. There may be reasons for not 
starting innovation activities at all, or factors that slow innovation activity or have a negative 
effect on expected results. These include economic factors, such as high costs or lack of demand, 
and enterprise factors, such as a lack of skilled personnel or knowledge. Regarding obstacles to 
innovation, results show an effect of LBOs on two factors hampering innovation activities: lack 
of skilled personnel and lack of external financial resource. These results suggest that LBO 
targets do not have the skilled personnel needed to engage in innovation activities, or their 
innovation activities may be slowed because they are unable to find the necessary personnel on 
the labour market. Moreover, contrary to Boucly et al. (2011) who show that LBOs can alleviate 
financial constraints and foster growth, our results suggest that LBO targets lack external 
financial resource for their innovation activities.  
b) Robustness check 
We evaluate the robustness of the estimations by changing the matching algorithms. The 
matching algorithms used are nearest neighbor (with one and three neighbors), radius (with a 
caliper of 0.06) and kernel. The impact on innovation variables does not appear to depend 
critically on the algorithm used, since both the value of the coefficients and its significance are 
very similar using different alternatives. In particular, we find no impact of LBOs on innovation 
expenditure whatever the algorithm used. 
5. Conclusion 
Hence, although most commentators in the public debate and many financial economists consider 
LBOs as a way to implement drastic, “cost cutting” measures, this paper provides evidence that 
ex-post innovation expenditure is similar in LBO targets and comparable firms in France. In 
addition, we find no evidence that, as for contribution to innovation, LBOs alleviate financial 
constraints or facilitate business relations.  
In contrast, we find an effect of LBOs on service innovation but this effect is not related to 
radical or disruptive innovation as LBOs have an impact on product innovation that is new only 
to the firm. Moreover, results show that LBO targets are more likely to implement marketing 
innovations (design and packaging and product promotion) in order to increase turnover and 
market share. This result is in line with the idea that, following an LBO, management is not only 
focused on “cost cutting” activities that aim to increase value creation. Private equity firms also 
encourage managers of LBO targets to build new strategies to find and exploit value creation 
potentials. Further, these results emphasize the resources and capabilities that buyout specialists 
bring in terms of contribution to innovation to their portfolio companies as they suggest that 
LBOs do not lead to the acquisition of skills or resources that enable the introduction of 
disruptive innovation. Adversely, results show that post-LBO innovations, which are mainly 
based upon marketing and service innovations, rely on existing resources with only the addition 
of a marketing competency.  
Contrary to Boucly et al (2011), results also suggest that LBOs do not alleviate financial 
constraints as we find a positive effect of LBOs on the lack of financial resources as a factor 
hampering innovation. Moreover, as we find no effect of LBOs on radical innovations or new 
products or services, it seems that LBOs do not help to achieve such radical innovation. This 
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result could be a clue that LBOs lead to the strengthening of financial and human resources 
constraints that hamper radical innovation. 
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Appendix 1 – Variable definitions 
Variable type Variable code Variable definition 
Innovation 
expenditure 
Inno2006 
Innovation expenditure in 2006 as percent of 
turnover in 2006 
Product 
innovations 
inpdgd 
=1 if firm has introduced a new or significantly 
improved product on the market between 2004 and 
2006 
inpdsv 
= 1 if firm has introduced a new or significantly 
improved service on the market between 2004 and 
2006 
newmkt 
=1 if firm has introduced a product (good or service) 
new to the market between 2004 and 2006 
newfrm 
=1 if firm has introduced a product (good or service) 
new to the firm between 2004 and 2006 
turnmar 
Share of total turnover from products (goods or 
services) new to the market 
turnin 
Share of total turnover from products (goods or 
services) new to the firm 
turnung 
Share of total turnover from products that were 
unchanged or only marginally modified 
Process 
innovations 
inpspd 
=1 if firm has introduced a new or significantly 
improved production process on the market between 
2004 and 2006 
inpslg 
=1 if firm has introduced a new or significantly 
improved supply chain process on the market 
between 2004 and 2006 
inpssu 
=1 if firm has introduced a new or significantly 
improved support process on the market between 
2004 and 2006 
Organisational 
innovations 
oorgbup 
=1 if firm has introduced new business practices 
between 2004 and 2006 
oorgkms 
=1 if firm has introduced new knowledge 
management systems between 2004 and 2006 
oorgwkp 
=1 if firm has introduced new workplace 
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organisation between 2004 and 2006 
oorgexr 
=1 if firm has introduced new organizational 
methods in firm‟s external relations between 2004 
and 2006 
Marketing 
innovations 
mktdgp 
=1 if firm has introduced significant changes in 
product design and packaging between 2004 and 
2006 
mktpdp 
=1 if firm has introduced new marketing methods in 
product promotion between 2004 and 2006 
mktpdl 
=1 if firm has introduced new marketing methods in 
product placement between 2004 and 2006 
mktpri 
=1 if firm has introduced innovations in pricing 
between 2004 and 2006 
Patents and other 
protection 
methods 
ProPat =1 if firm has used patents between 2004 and 2006 
ProDsg 
=1 if firm has used registration of design between 
2004 and 2006 
ProTm 
=1 if firm has used trademarks between 2004 and 
2006 
ProCp 
=1 if firm has used copyrights between 2004 and 
2006 
ProSol 
=1 if firm has used “Soleau envelopes” between 
2004 and 2006 
ProSct 
=1 if firm has used secrecy (not covered by legal 
agreements) between 2004 and 2006 
ProCon 
=1 if firm has used complexity of product design 
between 2004 and 2006 
ProTech 
=1 if firm has used lead time advantage over 
competitors between 2004 and 2006 
Factors 
hampering 
innovation 
activities* 
HFent Lack of funds within the enterprise 
HFout Lack of finance from sources outside the enterprise 
HCos Cost too high 
HPer Lack of qualified personnel 
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HTec Lack of information on technology 
HInf Lack of information on markets 
HPar Difficulty in finding cooperation partner 
HDom Market dominated by established enterprises 
HDem Uncertain demand for innovative goods or services 
HPrior No need to innovate due to earlier innovations 
HMar No need because of lack of demand for innovations 
*For factors hampering innovation activities, the survey contains questions regarding their degree 
of importance and these variables can take values from 0 (no importance) to 3 (high importance).  
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Appendix 2 – Balancing test 
This table shows statistics for the covariates used in the probit regressions before and after propensity score 
matching. The matching method used is radius with a caliper of 0.06. The «Treated» column shows the mean of 
covariates for LBO firms with a matched pair. In Panel B, one LBO firm has no matched pair within the defined 
caliper. «Potential Controls» shows the mean for the non LBO (1,144) firms- i.e before treatment. «T-test before 
treatment» shows the t-stat for the difference between Treated and Potential Controls. «Selected Controls» shows the 
mean for the matched non LBO control firms –i.e. after treatment. «T-test after Treatment» shows the t-stat for the 
difference between Treated and Selected Control. The last column shows the reduction in bias due to treatment. 
Panel A: Sample 2001-2005 (89 LBOs among 89) 
Variable Treated Potential 
Controls 
t-test before 
Treatment 
Selected 
controls 
t-test after 
treatment 
Reduction 
Bias (%) 
Turnover 
(ln(turnover)) 
17.189 
 
16.557 4.02*** 16.867 1.44 49.0 
ROIC 0.226 
 
0.197 0.43 0.209 0.24 41.6 
Debt-to-Equity 56.629 
 
80.922 -0.36 63.660 -0.13 71.1 
Income Taxes 0.024 
 
0.016 2.75*** 0.019 1.03 31.2 
Liquidity 0.363 
 
0.715 -0.66 0.467 -0.34 71.4 
Working 
Capital 
0.217 
 
0.194 0.49 0.208 0.10 62.2 
  
Panel B: Sample 2001-2004 (68 LBOs among 69) 
Variable Treated Potential 
Controls 
t-test before 
Treatment 
Selected 
controls 
t-test after 
treatment 
Reduction 
Bias (%) 
Turnover 
(ln(turnover)) 
17.076 
 
16.519 2.96*** 16.841 0.87 56.1 
ROIC 0.259 
 
0.192 0.89 0.229 0.36 52.3 
Debt-to-Equity 57.422 
 
69.230 -0.23 61.877 -0.08 64.7 
Income Taxes 0.023 
 
0.016 3.33*** 0.020 0.77 66.0 
Liquidity 0.445 
 
0.717 -0.45 0.490 -0.13 83.7 
Working 
Capital 
0.219 
 
0.1894 0.66 0.201 0.17 52.2 
***: significant at the 1% level 
 
